

## CURRICULUM VITAE

**DAN LEVIN, Ph.D.**

**APRIL 2009**

**HOME ADDRESS:**

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**OFFICE ADDRESS:**

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**PERSONAL DATA:**

Citizenship: U.S.A. and Israel  
Married with two children.

**EDUCATION:**

Ph.D., Economics, 1982, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts.  
Thesis title: "Essays on Government Regulation and Market Structure."  
Supervisors: Professors F.M. Fisher and R. Schmalensee.

B.A., Magna Cum Laude, Economics, 1974, Tel-Aviv University, Israel.

**POSITIONS HELD:**

Appointed Fellow of the Department of Economics at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, April 2008, a five years appointment.

Appointed Distinguished Professor by Ohio-State University, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, a five-year term beginning October 1, 2007.

Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Economics, Ohio-State University, Columbus, Ohio. September 1996 to October 1998.

Professor, Department of Economics, Ohio-State University, Columbus, Ohio. October 1995 to present.

Graduate Program Director, Department of Economics, University of Houston, Texas. September 1987 to June 1988 and from September 1989 to August 1991.

Assistant Professor, Sep. 1982 to Sep. 1987; Associate Professor, Sep. 1987 to Sep. 1990; Professor, Sep. 1990 to Sep. 1995. Department of Economics, University of Houston, Houston, Texas.

**VISITING POSITIONS HELD:**

December 2008, Visiting Professor, Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

December 2008, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

December 2007, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

December 2006-March 2007, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

May-June 2006, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.

May 2006, Visiting Professor, Max Plank Institute for Economics, Jena, Germany.

December 2005, Visiting Professor, Eitan Berglas School of Economics (EBSE), Tel Aviv University, Israel.

April-May 2005, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Yale University.

December 2004, Visiting Professor, EBSE, Tel Aviv University, Israel

August-December 2004, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

December 2003, Visiting Professor, EBSE, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

August 2002 to June 2003, Visiting Scholar, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

January-June, 1992, Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

**FIELD OF SPECIALIZATION:**

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Experimental Economics.

**SCHOLARSHIPS:**

M.I.T. Graduate Scholarship, 1976 to 1977

Tel-Aviv University Graduate Scholarship, 1975 to 1976

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE:**

1. Microeconomics (regularly at all levels).
2. Industrial Organization (both Graduate and Undergraduate).
3. Experimental Economics (Graduate students).

**GRANTS:**

- 1983: Energy Laboratory, University of Houston.
- 1984, Summer: Center for Public Policy, University of Houston.
- 1984-1986: Co-Principal Investigator, NSF IST 84-08396, "The Role of Information and Information Processing in Auctions: Theory and Experimentation." (J.H. Kagel and R. M. Harstad, Co-PI's, \$108,000).
- 1986, Summer: Energy Laboratory, University of Houston.
- 1986-1988: Co-Principal Investigator, NSF IST 840936, Renewal of the previous NSF grant. (J. H. Kagel, Co-PI, \$214,000).
- 1987, Summer: Co-Principal Investigator, Sloan Foundation Grant in Behavioral Economic program. (J. Kagel, Co-PI, \$30,000).
- 1988, Summer: Energy Laboratory, University of Houston (with J.H. Kagel).
- 1989, Summer: Center for Public Policy, University of Houston.
- 1990, Summer: Principal Investigator, Advanced Research Program "Cigarettes Taxation: Raising Revenue and Reducing Consumption" (B. Baltagi, Co-PI, \$31,108).
- 1990-1991: Co-Principal Investigator, Renewal of the previous NSF grant. (J. H. Kagel Co-PI, \$25,681.)
- 1991-1993: Co-Principal Investigator, NSF SES-9112771, "Collaborative Research in Experimental Studies of Auction Markets". (J.H. Kagel Co-PI, \$24,000).
- 1992, Summer: Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Laboratory, University of Houston, "Auctions without Artificial Barriers to Entry." (James L. Smith Co-PI).
- 1992, Summer: Co-Principal Investigator, Resources for the Future, "Experimental and Empirical Research in Auctions with Entry." (J. Smith Co-PI, \$24,967).

- 1993, Summer: Principal Investigator, Energy Laboratory, University of Houston, “Information Processing by Bidders in Common-Value (Mineral Lease) Auctions and Its Affect on Performance.”
- 1993-1995: Principal Investigator, Texas Advanced Research Program “Auctions With Entry: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation.” (\$53,000).
- 1994, Summer: Principal Investigator, Energy Laboratory, University of Houston, “Auctions with Entry: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation.”
- 1995, Winter: Seed Grant from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the Ohio State University (\$8,506)
- 1996-1998: Principal Investigator, NSF SBR-9631645 “Collaborative Research: Multi-Unit Demand Auctions.” (\$181,582).
- 1999-2001: Principal Investigator, NSF SES –9820229, “Electoral Participation Under Alternative Jurisdictional Structures: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation,” (Colin Campbell Co-PI, \$214,064).
- 2002-2004: Co-Principal Investigator, NSF SES–0136928, “Experimental and Theoretical Investigation of Auctions,” (John Kagel PI, \$496,574
- 2004-2006: Co-Principal Investigator, NSF SES–0417352, “Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A theoretical and Experimental Investigation.” (James Peck PI, \$247,384).
- 2006-2007: Principal Investigator, NSF SES-0609744, Asen Ivanov’s Doctoral Dissertation Research: “Ambiguity Aversion and Strategic Play in One-Shot Normal-Form Games.” (\$6350)

**AWARDS:**

- 1987 University of Houston, Cap and Gown Chapter, Top Professor Award, 1987.
- 1990 University of Houston, College of Social Sciences, Merit Award for Research.
- 1990 University of Houston, College of Social Sciences Teaching Excellence Award for 1989-90.
- 1999 The Ohio State University, College of Social Behavioral Sciences, Selected as a Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow,
- 2003 Selected as 2004 John Glenn Scholar.

**SERVICE:**

- Appointed one-year member of the department Chair advisory committee, October 2007.
- Co-Organizer: SUNY Stony Brook program in Experimental Economics, Summer 2007.
- The OSU Council on Academic Freedom and Responsibility, June 2007 to Present.
- Associate Editor, *Games and Economic Behavior*, June 2004 to present.
- NSF's Economics Advisory Panel, July 2001, two years appointment.
- The Ohio State University, Member of the SBS College P&T Committee, 2000 to 2003.
- NSF's panelist, Knowledge and Distributed Intelligence, Washington D.C., March 1999.
- NSF's panelist, Knowledge and Distributed Intelligence, Washington D.C., July 1998.
- The Ohio-State University, Dean's Advisory Committee on College Priorities, 1998-04.
- University of Houston, Senator, Faculty Senate, January 1991 to January 1994.
- Houston, President, Hebrew Speaking Professional Organization, 9/1992 to 8/1993.
- University of Houston, College of Social Sciences' P&T Committee, 1990.
- University of Houston, Graduate and Professional Studies Council, 9/1990 to 8/1993.
- University of Houston, Department Executive Committee, Sept. 1990 to August 1993.

**PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:**

December 1983, San Francisco, CA. Meetings of the Econometric Society. Presented: "Common Value Auctions: An Initial Experimental Study."

June 1984, Stanford, CA. Meetings of the Econometric Society. Presented: "Common Value Auctions: An Initial Experimental Study."

December 1984, Dallas, Texas. Meetings of the Econometric Society. Presented: "Information Impact in First Price Auctions with Positively Affiliated Private Valuations: An Experimental Study."

August 1985, Cambridge, MA. Econometric Society 5<sup>th</sup> World Congress. Presented: "Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Auctions: Theory and Experiments."

November 1985, Norman, OK. Conf. on Laboratory Markets. University of Oklahoma. Discussant on "Analysis of an Incentive Compatible Contract in the Laboratory."

March 1986, Tucson, AZ. Conference on Experimental Economics. Presented: "Resolving Uncertainty About the Number of Bidders in Auctions."

May 1987, Boston, MA. 7th International Symposium on Forecasting. Presented: "Bidder Behavior and Public Information in Second-Price Common-Value Auctions."

August 1990, Barcelona, Spain. Econometric Society 6th World Congress. Presented: "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing in the Laboratory: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence."

February 1992, Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University. Presented: "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry."

March 1992, Washington, DC. Resources For The Future. Presented: "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry."

March 1992, Washington, DC. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. Presented: "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry."

March 1992, Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh. Presented: "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry."

April 1992, Charlottesville, VA. University of Virginia. Presented: "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry."

- April 1992, Richmond, VA. Virginia Commonwealth University. Presented: "An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Chain-Store Game."
- May 1992, Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University. Presented "An: Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Chain-Store Game."
- August 1992, Tel Aviv, Israel. Tel Aviv University's Summer 92 Program. Presented: "An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Chain-Store Game."
- August 1992, Frankfurt, Germany. Goethe University. Presented: "An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Chain-Store Game."
- February 1993, Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh. Presented: "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions."
- February 1993, Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University. Presented: "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions."
- February 1993, Blacksburg, VA. Virginia Tech. Presented: "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions."
- October 1993, Tucson, AZ. Conference on Experimental Economics. Presented: "Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation."
- November 1994, Tucson, AZ. Conference on Experimental Economics. Presented: "Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation."
- November 1994, Orlando FLA. Southern Economic Association. Presented: "Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation."
- November 1994, Orlando FLA. Southern Economic Association. Presented: "Auctions with Entry: An Experimental Investigation,"
- January 1995, Columbus, OH. Ohio State University. Presented: "Information, Competition and Behavior in Auctions: Perspectives from Theoretical and Experimental Research."
- November 1995, Princeton, NJ. Princeton University. A discussant in the Conference on Market Design: Spectrum Auctions and Beyond.
- May 1996, Barcelona, Spain. Pompeu Fabra University. Conference on Auctions, Theory and Empirics. Presented "Entry Coordination in Auctions: An experimental Investigation."

February 1997, South Bend, Indiana. University of Notre Dame. Presented: "Auctions: A Dialog Between Theory and Experiment."

April 1997, Cincinnati, Ohio. University of Cincinnati. Presented: "Auctions: A Dialog Between Theory and Experiment."

May 1997, Mannheim, Germany. Mannheim University. Presented: "Common-Value Auctions With Asymmetric Information."

May 1997, Bonn, Germany. Conference on Bounded Rationality, "Behavior in Multi-unit Independent-Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Investigation."

September 1997, Houston, Texas. Un. of Houston. Presented: "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey auctions."

November 1997, Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh. Presented: "On Selling Mechanisms in Common-Value Environment."

November 1997, Atlanta, Georgia. Southern Economic Association Meetings. Presented: "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions."

January 1998, Chicago, Illinois. American Economic Association Meetings. Presented: "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions."

March 1998, West Lafayette, IN. Purdue Un. Presented: "Independent-Private-Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions."

June 1998, Mannheim, Germany. Economic Science Association 1998 Annual Meeting. Presented: "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions."

June 1998, Montreal, Canada. North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society. Presented: "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: An Experiment Comparing Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions."

March 1999, New Orleans, LA. Economic Science Association and Public Choice Meeting. Presented: "Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions."

May 2000, Aspen Institute at Wye River Maryland, Conference sponsored by the FCC, NSF and Stanford University on Combinatorial Auctions. Discussant of Cybernomics' proposal and experiments for the FCC.

August 2000, Seattle WA. Econometric Society 8th World Congress. Presented: "Multi-Unit Demand Auctions with Synergies: Behavior in Sealed-Bid versus Ascending-Bid Uniform Price Auctions."

March 2001, Cleveland Ohio, Midwest Economic Association. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."

April 2001, Washington D.C., Federal Trade Commission. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

June 2001, Barcelona Spain. Economic Science Association. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."

September 10, 2001, Baltimore Maryland, Johns Hopkins University. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

September, 2001, Saint Louis, Missouri, Washington University. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

September 2001, Aspen Institute at Wye River Maryland, Conference sponsored by the FCC, NSF and Stanford University on Combinatorial Auctions. Discussant.

November 2001, Miami, Florida, Florida International University, South-Eastern Conference on Economic Theory. Presented, "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."

March 2002, Chicago, Illinois, Midwest Economic Association. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."

April 2002, Princeton, New Jersey. Institute of Advance Studies, Princeton University. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

April 2002, Santa Barbara, California, University of California at Santa Barbara. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

April 2002, Berkeley, California, University of California at Berkeley. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."

May 2002, Santa Cruz, California, University of California at Santa Cruz. Presented: "When and Why not to Auction."

- August 2002, Venice, Italy, European Economic Association Meeting. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."
- October 2002, New York, New York, Columbia University, Center for the Decision Sciences. Presented: "Bayesian Updating, Reinforcement, and Complexity Aversion: A Laboratory Study."
- October 2002, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University. Presented: "Bayesian Updating, Reinforcement and Complexity Aversion: A Laboratory Study."
- March 2003, Blacksburg, VA. Virginia Tech. Presented: "Bayesian Updating, Reinforcement and Complexity Aversion: A Laboratory Study."
- May 2003, Boston, MA, Boston University. Presented: "Two papers on Dynamic Entry."
- May 2003, Boston, MA, Harvard Business School. Presented: "Comparing Efficient Multi-Object Auction Institutions."
- July 2003, Stony Brook, NY, State University of New York at Stony Brook. Presented: "Bayesian Updating vs. Reinforcement and Affect: A Laboratory Study."
- October 2003, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Carnegie Mellon University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."
- December 2003, Tel Aviv, Israel, Tel Aviv University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."
- April 2004, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michigan University (STIET). Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."
- May 2004, Montreal, Canada, McGill University, Canadian Economic Theory Conf. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."
- June 2004, Paris, France, FUR XI-Paris 2004. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."
- July 2004, Marseilles, France, Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

September 2004, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

October 2004, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."

October 2004, New Haven, Connecticut, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Presented: "Auctions with Uncertain Number of Bidders."

November 2004, Copenhagen University, Denmark, Conference on Auctions. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

December 6, 2004, Ramat Gan, Israel, Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."

December 8, 2004, Ramat Aviv, Israel, Tel Aviv University (Economics). Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

December 14, 2004, Ramat Aviv, Israel, Recanati Business School, Tel Aviv University. Presented: "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

December 16, 2004, Be'er Sheva, Israel, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."

December 22, 2004, Jerusalem, Israel, Department of Finance, Hebrew University. Presented: "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity and Psychological Affect."

December 27, 2004, Istanbul, Turkey, Koc University. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

April 2005, New Haven, CT, Department of Economics, Yale University. Presented: "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

May 2005, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University. Presented: "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

June 2005, Montreal, Canada, Economic Science Association. Presented: "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

September 2005, Hillrod, Denmark. A conference on Herding Behavior. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

November 2005, Washington, DC, Southern Economic Association meetings: Organized the session "Economics meet Psychology and presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

December 2005, Jerusalem, Israel, Department of Economics, Hebrew University. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

May 4, 2006, Jena, Germany, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

May 10, 2006, Magdeburg, Germany, University of Magdeburg. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

May 15, 2006, Berlin, Germany, Humboldt University. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

June 2006, Copenhagen, Denmark, University of Denmark. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

September 12, 2006, Nashville, Tennessee, Vanderbilt University. Presented, "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

September 18, 2006, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, University of Illinois. Presented:  
(I) "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values," and  
(II) "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

November 2006, Santa Barbara, California, UCSB. Presented: "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values."

February 21, 2007, Stanford, California, Stanford University Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values." (Plus Experimental Extensions.)

February 28, 2007, San Diego, California, UCSD. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

March 4, 2007, Los Angeles, California, South West Economic Theory, USC. Presented: "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: An Experimental Investigation."

March 6, 2007, Los Angeles, California, UCLA. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

June 20, 2007, Ramat Aviv, Israel, Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University. Presented: "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values."

October 19, 2007, Madison Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin. Presented: "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values."

December 3, 2007, Jerusalem Israel, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University. Presented: "Violations of Monotonicity in Economics; the case of FOSD, Conjunction Principle and more: An Experimental Perspective."

December 16, 2007, Jerusalem Israel, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University, Conference in Honor of Ehud Kalai. "Presented": "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values."

February 9, 2008, Santa Barbara, California, UCSB, Conference on Experimental and Behavioral Economics. Presented: Teams and Cognitive Errors – synthesis of previous and new work,"

March 15, 2008, MEA meetings in Chicago. Presented: "Efficiency and Synergy in a Multi-Unit Auction with and without Package bidding: an Experimental Study,"

March 18, 2008, Washington University, Saint Louis. Presented two works: (Lunch talk), "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study." (Departmental seminar) "Efficiency and Synergy in a Multi-Unit Auction with and without Package bidding: an Experimental Study."

April 8, 2008, College Park, Maryland, University of Maryland, Presented: "Efficiency and Synergy in a Multi-Unit Auction with and without Package bidding: an Experimental Study,"

June 28, 2008, ESA meetings in Caltech, Pasadena, California. Presented: Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values."

October 13, 2008, Manhattan, Kansas, Kansas State University, Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

October 23, 2008, Tucson, Arizona, University of Arizona. Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

Novemer 25, 2008, Tilburg, Netherland, Tilburg University, Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

November 27, 2008, Maastricht, Netherland, Maastricht University. Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

December 3, 2008, Jerusalem, Israel, Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

December 15, 2008, Ramat Aviv, Israel, Tel Aviv University. Presented: "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winners Curse? An Experimental Study."

April 2009, HEC, Paris, France, A Conference on Decision Theory. Presented: "Ellsberg Paradox Revisited: An Experimental Investigation."

**REFEREE FOR:** *American Economic Review; American Journal of Agricultural Economics; Canadian Journal of Economics; Econometrica; Economic Inquiry; Economic Journal; Economic Letters; Economic Theory; Economica; European Economic Review; International Economic Review; International Journal of Game Theory; International Journal of Industrial Organization; International Review of Law and Economics; Israel Science Foundation; Journal of Games and Economic Behavior; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Journal of Economic Education; Journal of Economic Psychology; Journal of Economic Theory; Journal of Economics; Journal of Economics and Business; Journal of Economics & Management Strategy; Journal of Experimental Economics; Journal of Finance; Journal of Financial Services Research; Journal of Industrial Economics; Journal of Money Credit and Banking; Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; Journal of Political Economy; Journal of Public Economics; Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; National Science Foundation; National Tax Journal; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; Quarterly Journal of Business Economics; Quarterly Journal of Economics; RAND Journal of Economics; Review of Economic Design; Review of Economic Studies; Review of Economics and Statistics; Review of International Economics; Southern Economic Journal; US-Israel BSF.*

**PUBLICATIONS:** (T, E, EM, denote theoretical, experimental and empirical papers respectively.)

- 1.T** “A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions,” **1985**, *Review of Economic Studies*, No. 52, 525-528. (with R. M. Harstad)
- 2.E** “Individual Bidder Behavior in First-Price Private-Value Auctions,” **1985**, *Economics Letters*, No. 19, 125-128. (with J. H. Kagel)
- 3.T** “Taxation Within Cournot Oligopoly,” *Journal of Public Economics*,” **1985**, No. 27, 81-290.
- 4.T** “Symmetric Bidding in Second-Price Common-Value Auctions,” **1986**, *Economics Letters*, No. 20, 315-319. (with R. M. Harstad)
- 5.E** “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common-Value Auctions,” **1986**, *American Economic Review*, No. 76, 894-920. (with J. H. Kagel)

Reprinted in *Recent Developments in Experimental Economics*, 1993, Vol. 2, edited by J. Hey and G. Loomes, Edward Elgar UK.

Reprinted in *Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse*, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.

Reprinted in *Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management*, 2005, edited by Max H. Bazerman, Edward Elgar, UK, forthcoming.

Reprinted in *Introduzione Alla Behavioral & Experimental Economics* (Italian) Edited by Matteo Motterlini and Francesco Guala, University of Bocconi Press, Milano, Italy, forthcoming.

- 6.T** “On Dominance Solvable Auctions in General Symmetric Model,” **1986**, *Economics Letters*, No. 22, 165-167.
- 7.EM** “Estimating Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes Using Panel Data: The Effects of Bootlegging, Taxation and Advertising, Reconsidered,” **1986**, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, No. 68, 148-155. (with B. H. Baltagi)
- 8.E** “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Valuations: An Experimental Study,” **1987**, *Econometrica*, Vol. 55, 1275-1304. (with J. H. Kagel and R. M. Harstad)

Reprinted in *Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse*, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.

- 9.T** “Stackelberg, Cournot and Collusive Monopoly: Performance and Welfare Comparison,” **1988**, *Economic Inquiry*, Vol. 26, 317-330.
- 10.E** “A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis,” **1989**, *Economic Journal*, Vol. 99, No. 394, 108-115. (with D. Dyer and J. H. Kagel)
- Reprinted in *Recent Developments in Experimental Economics*, 1993, Vol. 2, edited by J. Hey and G. Loomes, Edward Elgar UK.
- Reprinted in *Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse*, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.
- 11.E** “First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the ‘Winner’s Curse’,” **1989**, *Economic Inquiry*, Vol. 27, 241-58. (with J. H. Kagel, R. Battalio and D. Meyer)
- Reprinted in *Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse*, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.
- 12.E** “Resolving Uncertainty About Numbers of Bidders in Independent-Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis,” **1989**, *RAND Journal of Economics*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 268-279. (with D. Dyer and J. H. Kagel)
- 13.T** “Equilibrium Bid Function for Auctions with an Uncertain Number of Bidders,” **1990**, *Economics Letters*, No. 33, 35-40. (with R.H. Harstad and J.H. Kagel)
- 14.T** “Trade Liberalization and Domestic Monopoly: A Welfare Analysis,” **1990**, *International Economic Review*, Vol. 31, 773-782. (with R. Eldor)
- 15.T** “Horizontal Mergers: The 50 Percent Benchmark,” **1990**, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 80, 1238-1245.
- 16.E** “The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common-Value Auctions: Reply” **1991**, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 81, 362-69. (with J. H. Kagel),
- Reprinted in *Recent Developments in Experimental Economics*, 1993, Vol. 2, edited by J. Hey and G. Loomes, Edward Elgar UK.
- 17.T** “Comment on ‘Some Evidence on the Winner’s Curse’,” **1991**, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 81, 370-375. (with J. L. Smith)

**18.EM** “Cigarettes Taxation: Raising Revenues and Reducing Consumption,” **1992**, *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, V. 3, 321-33. (with B. H. Baltagi)

**19.E** “Independent-Private-Values Auctions: Bidder Behavior in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders,” **1993**, *Economic Journal*, Vol. 103, 868-879. (with J. H. Kagel)

**20.E** “On the Existence of Predatory pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in a Chain-Store Game,” **1994**, *RAND Journal of Economics*, Vol. 25, 72-93. (with Yun Joo Jung and J. H. Kagel),

Reprinted in, Pricing Tactics, Strategies, And Outcomes, 2007, edited by Michael Waldman and Justin P. Johnson, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

**21.T** “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” **1994**, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 84, 585-599. (with J. L. Smith)

Reprinted in the Economic Theory of Auctions, 2000, edited by Paul Klemperer, Edward Publishing.

**22.T** “Social Attributes and Strategic Equilibrium: A Restaurant Pricing Game,” **1994**, *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 102, 822-40. (with E. Karni)

**23.E** “Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions,” **1995**, *International Journal of Game Theory*, Vol. 24, 293-319. (with J. H. Kagel and R. H. Harstad)

Reprinted in Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.

**24.T** “Ranking Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders,” **1996**, *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 68, 549-61. (with J. L. Smith)

**25.E** “Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions,” **1996**, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 86, 442-460. (with J. H. Kagel and Jean-Francois Richard)

Reprinted in Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse, 2002 (J. H. Kagel and D. Levin), Princeton University Press.

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- “Auctions with Entry and Resale,” (with Xiaoshu Xu and Lixin Ye).
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- “Efficiency and Synergy in a Multi-Unit Auction with and without Package bidding: An Experimental Study,” (with Kirill Chernomaz).

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- “Ellsberg Paradox Revisited: An Experimental Investigation,” (with Tao Wang).
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